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Since the 1960s, Tobin has set himself the objective of developing a macroeconomic
model more general than that specified by Keynes in the General Theory. In his works,
he explicitly deals with financial intermediaries and elaborates a ‘new view’ which, in
contrast with the ‘old view’, maintains that there are no reasons to attribute a special
role to the banks. This paper critically analyses Tobin’s theory and shows that this
theory overlooks an important function of banks highlighted by Keynes, and that the
specification of this banks’ function is the necessary condition to highlight the most
significant aspects of what Keynes calls a monetary economy. These points enable us to
draw some observations about the question of the financial system regulation.
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JEL classifications: E12, E40, E44, G21
1. Introduction
Since the 1960s, Tobin has set himself the objective of developing a macroeconomic model
more general than that specified by Keynes in the General Theory. Keynes had assumed that
all the assets different from money were perfect substitutes; this hypothesis allowed him to
explain only one interest rate. On the contrary, Tobin abandons the perfect substitutability
hypothesis and elaborates a theoretical model that envisages more than two assets and
explicitly deals with financial intermediaries. Moreover, Tobin asks himself whether banks
play a special role compared with the other intermediaries and elaborates a ‘new view’
which, in contrast with the ‘old view’, maintains that there are no reasons to attribute a
special role to the banks. This paper critically analyses Tobin’s theory and presents two
results. First, it shows that Tobin’s theory underestimates an important function of banks.
Tobin analyses the role of banks by using the capital account of an economic system
that specifies the assets and liabilities of the sectors of the economy; according to this
approach, the banks’ role consists in matching the portfolio preferences of debtors and
creditors. Following this approach, Tobin underestimates one aspect of banks’ activities,
which is to create money to finance investment decisions, a function highlighted by Keynes
in some writings that preceded and followed the publication of the General Theory. Second,
the paper underlines that the explicit consideration of the presence of banks and bank
money and the specification of the process of investment decisions financing allows us to
highlight the most important aspects of what Keynes calls a monetary economy. This paper
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is organised as follows. In Section 2, the most important aspects of Tobin’s ‘new view’ are
described. The limitations of this theoretical approach are then shown in Section 3, and in
Section 4, the consequences of the specification of the role of banks in financing investment
decisions are outlined. This analysis enables us to draw some observations about the role
of the banking system in the global financial crisis and about the question of the financial
system regulation.
2. Tobin’s ‘new view’
Tobin presents his theory of financial intermediaries by starting from a criticism of the ‘old
view’, according to which banks play a special role compared with the other intermediaries.
Under the ‘old view’, the specificity of banks derives from the fact that their liabilities, unlike
those of other intermediaries, are used as a means of payment, i.e. they are money. And so
this allows banks to offer credit by creating new money while the other intermediaries can
only lend what they manage to collect from savers. Tobin observes that according to the
‘old view’:
a long line of financial heretics have been right in speaking of ‘fountain pen money’ – money
created by the stroke of the bank president’s pen when he approves a loan and credits the
proceeds to the borrower’s checking account. . . . On the other hand, financial intermediaries
other than banks do not create money, and the scale of their assets is limited by their liabilities,
i.e. by the savings the public entrusts to them. They cannot count on receiving ‘deposits’ to
match every extension of their lending. (Tobin 1963, pp. 408–409)
The ‘old view’ held that banks are special because depositors entrust to banks whatever
amount banks are willing to lend, whereas other intermediaries lend up to what they are
able to collect. For this reason, Tobin (1963) notes that the supporters of the ‘old view’
deem it necessary to impose a reserve requirement on banks in order to limit banks’ loans.
Tobin sets out, in contrast to the ‘old view’, a ‘new view’, according to which the
fact that the banks’ liabilities are used as a means of payment does not invest them with
a special role compared with other financial intermediaries; in particular, it does not give
banks the power to expand credit in an unlimited way. Tobin’s ‘new view’ asserts that banks’
dimensions are subject to the same constraints that condition the dimensions of the other
intermediaries. Tobin criticises the ‘old view’ because it neglects the store of wealth func-
tion of money. Tobin’s analysis has his theoretical roots in Hicks’s famous article (Hicks
1935) and in the General Theory. This analysis is based on the concept of demand for
money and maintains that the most important question that monetary theory has to deal
with is to explain: ‘why paper that makes no intrinsic contribution to utility or technology
is held at all and has positive value in exchange for goods and services’ (Tobin 1982,
p. 173). Tobin observes that the ‘old view’ is based on the assumption that wealth holders
are willing to accumulate all the liabilities that banks decide to create; in other words,
according to the ‘old view’: ‘the preferences of the public normally play no role in deter-
mining the total volume of deposits or the total quantity of money’ (Tobin 1963, p. 408). On
the contrary, Tobin, focusing on the store of wealth function of money, emphasises that the
portfolio preferences of wealth owners influence the quantity of bank money. He justifies
this conclusion by distinguishing between money created by governments and bank money
and he notes that only the quantity of money created by the government is independent
of wealth owners’ portfolio preferences since wealth owners cannot destroy legal tender;
instead, bank money is created and destroyed through economic transactions:
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Evidently the fountain pens of commercial bankers are essentially different from the printing
presses of governments. Confusion results from concluding that because bank deposits are
like currency in one respect – both serve as media of exchange – they are like currency in
every respect. Unlike governments, bankers cannot create means of payment to finance their
own purchases of goods and services. Bank-created ‘money’ is a liability, which must be
matched on the other side of the balance sheet. . . . Once created, printing press money cannot
be extinguished. . . . The community cannot get rid of its currency supply; the economy
must adjust until it is willingly absorbed. . . . For bank-created money, however, there is an
economic mechanism of extinction as well as creation, contraction as well as expansion. If
bank deposits are excessive relative to public preferences, they will tend to decline; otherwise
bank lose income. The burden of adaptation is not placed entirely on the rest of the economy.
(Tobin 1963, p. 415)
Tobin underlines that the economic decision that determines the quantity of bank money
is the portfolio decisions of wealth owners; presenting the ‘new view’ he assumes that there
are two groups of agent: wealth owners, who decide the composition of their portfolio by
choosing amongst the assets present in the market, and correspondingly, the debtors who
issue financial instruments. The choices of these two groups of agents are described by
specifying a capital account that is distinct from the income account.1 The analysis of the
capital account is developed by considering as exogenous data the values of the income
account. The presence of these two groups of agents is a necessary condition to justify
the existence of financial intermediaries. Financial intermediaries can match the portfolio
preferences of these two types of subjects thanks to their ability to assume liability of smaller
risk and greater liquidity than their assets.2 Tobin maintains that there are no reasons to
attribute a special role to banks; banks, like other intermediaries, issue liabilities that have
to satisfy the preferences of wealth owners, and they store up assets that satisfy the portfolio
preferences of borrowers. The fact that banks’ liabilities are used as means of payment is
not a sufficient reason to attribute a special role to the banks:
The special attention given to commercial banks in economic analysis is usually justified by the
observation that, alone among intermediaries, banks ‘create’ means of payment. This rationale
is on its face far from convincing. The means-of-payment characteristic of demand deposits is
indeed a feature differentiating bank liabilities from those of other intermediaries. Insurance
against death is equally a feature differentiating life insurance policies from the obligations of
other intermediaries, including banks. It is not obvious that one kind of differentiation should
be singled out for special analytical treatment. (Tobin 1963, p. 412)
Tobin maintains that banks may expand credit only if they succeed in inducing wealth
owners to increase their share of deposits and thus he concludes that the banks’ dimensions
depend on the same constraint that influences the other intermediaries:
Neither individually nor collectively do commercial banks possess a widow’s cruse. Quite apart
from legal reserve requirements, commercial banks are limited in scale by the same kinds of
economic processes that determine the aggregate size of other intermediaries. (Tobin 1963,
pp. 412–414)
We can illustrate Tobin’s thesis starting from the simplest model of capital account that
he analysed (Tobin and Brainard 1963). It is a model that considers only two assets, money
and capital goods, and that aggregates the operators in two sectors: the public sector that
issues money to finance its own deficit and the private sector that accumulates money and
capital goods. The equations that describe the conditions of equilibrium in the two markets
of assets determine the interest rate structure; in particular, given the rate of return on money,
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the model determines the yield on capital goods. The presence of financial intermediaries
in this model depends in the first place on the existence of economic agents willing to get
into debt to purchase an amount of existing capital goods greater than that of their wealth.
The intermediaries finance these agents by giving them money; the difference between the
banks and the other intermediaries is the fact that banks can create new money while the
other intermediaries obtain money by issuing financial instruments that must be absorbed
by the wealth holders in exchange for money. Tobin maintains that this difference is of
no importance as in both cases the agents that get into debt use the money received from
banks or from other intermediaries to purchase existing capital goods, and this will only
be possible if wealth owners are willing to sell capital goods in exchange for the liabilities
issued by the intermediaries. If we assume that the two operations, the granting of credit
and the purchase of existing capital goods, occur at the same time, we can conclude that
the presence and the dimensions of intermediaries depend on the willingness of wealth
owners to alter the composition of their wealth by selling capital goods in exchange for
the liabilities issued by the intermediaries: bank deposits (bank money) in the case of the
banks, or other assets issued by the non-bank intermediaries. Like the other intermediaries,
the banks will manage to grow in size only if the wealth owners are willing to sell capital
goods in exchange for their liabilities.3
3. A critical analysis of Tobin’s ‘new view’
Tobin’s analysis is coherent with the approach elaborated by Keynes in theGeneral Theory, a
theoretical scheme founded on the concept of money demand and on the liquidity preference
theory. Starting from the most simple economic system, described by the money–capital
goods model recalled in the previous paragraphs, Tobin divides the public (the private
sector): ‘into two parts: wealth-owners and borrowers. Wealth-owners command the total
private wealth of the economy and dispose it among the available assets, ranging from
currency, to direct ownership of capital. Borrowers use the loans they obtain . . . to direct
ownership of capital’ (Tobin and Brainard 1963, p. 388). The presence of these two groups
of agents constitutes the necessary condition for the presence of financial intermediaries
whose function, as has been recalled above, consists in reconciling the portfolio preferences
of debtors and wealth owners. According to Tobin, the presence of banks and financial in-
termediaries produces some significant effects, for example it reduces the interest rate at
which debtors can get finance,4 but the presence of bank money and financial intermedi-
aries does not alter the structure of the economic system whose essential aspects can be
described by means of the money–capital goods model. The explicit consideration of the
presence of banks does not alter the nature of the rate of interest; the rate of interest that
influences investment decisions always depends on the liquidity-preference schedule and
on the quantity of money determined by the monetary authorities. In other words, if we
consider Keynes’s definition of a monetary economy,5 we must conclude that according to
Tobin, the key characteristics of a monetary economy can be described by overlooking the
presence of bank and bank money.
The thesis put forward in this paper is that the presence of bank money and of banks is
the necessary condition to explain the characteristics of a monetary economy. This thesis is
presented by referring to the arguments Keynes (1937b, 1937c) used responding to critiques
of the interest rate theory set out in the General Theory; these arguments are recalled in this
section, while the role of bank money in a monetary economy is described in the following
section.
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Keynes explicitly considers the presence of banks and bank money when he responds to
the criticism of the liquidity preference theory by supporters of the loanable funds theory,
such as Ohlin (1937a, 1937b) and Robertson (1936), who state that the rate of interest
is determined by the demand and supply of loanable funds. Keynes acknowledges that in
the General Theory he overlooked the fact that the planning of an investment decision (ex
ante investment) leads firms to demand liquidity to finance this cost, and he fills this gap
by specifying a further motive for demanding money: the ‘finance motive’.6 He does not,
however, accept Ohlin’s thesis that the liquidity supply depends on saving decisions planned
by operators (ex ante saving), but he emphasises the role of banks in creating new money.7
While in the General Theory Keynes had overlooked the presence of bank money, when
responding to Ohlin’s criticism he uses the presence of banks to assert that the credit demand
of firms is met through the creation of money by the banks and not by means of savings:
The transition from a lower to a higher scale of activity involves an increased demand for liquid
resources which cannot be met without a rise in the rate of interest, unless the banks are ready
to lend more cash or the rest of the public to release more cash at the existing rate of interest.
If there is no change in the liquidity position, the public can save ex ante and ex post and ex
anything else until they are blue in the face, without alleviating the problem in the least. . . .
This means that, in general, the banks hold the key position in the transition from a lower to a
higher scale of activity. If they refuse to relax, the growing congestion of the short-term loan
market or of the new issue market, as the case may be, will inhibit the improvement, no matter
how thrifty the public propose to be out of their future incomes. (Keynes, 1937c, p. 222)
Keynes can thus be associated with what Tobin (1963, p. 408) calls: ‘a long line of
financial heretics’ who uphold the ‘old view’ in contrast with the traditional theory that
considers banks as mere intermediaries who lend what they collect. Tobin acknowledges
that banks can create money, and states that what conditions the volume of bank credit
is not the amount of pre-existent deposits but, as we saw previously, the willingness of
wealth owners to accumulate the money created by banks. Keynes reply to Ohlin allows
us to maintain that Tobin’s conclusion is valid only in the particular case in which agents
get into debt to finance the purchase of existing capital goods. In fact, we can distinguish
two components of the credit demand: (a) the demand from those who wish to buy existing
capital goods and (b) the demand from those who intend to buy newly produced goods,
in particular the demand for purchasing power on the part of entrepreneurs that intend to
realise new investments. Tobin states that in both cases, banks’ dimensions are subject to
the same tie: the wealth owners’ willingness to store up the new money. I believe that this
view is not correct; in order to justify this conclusion it is useful to recall Tobin’s argument:
The banking system can expand its assets either (a) by purchasing, or lending against, existing
assets; or (b) by lending to finance new private investment in inventories or capital goods, or
buying government securities financing new public deficits. In case (a) no increase in private
wealth occurs in conjunction with the banks’ expansion. There is no new private saving and
investment. In case (b), new private saving occurs, matching dollar for the private investments
or government deficits financed by the banking system. In neither case will there automatically
be an increase in savers’ demand for bank deposits equal to the expansion in bank assets.
In the second case, it is true, there is an increase in private wealth. But even if we assume a
closed economy in order to abstract from leakages of capital abroad, the community will not
ordinarily wish to put 100 per cent of its new saving into bank deposits. Bank deposits are,
after all, only about 15 per cent of total private wealth in the United States; other things equal,
savers cannot be expected greatly to exceed this proportion in allocating new saving. So, if all
new saving is to take the form of bank deposits, other things cannot stay equal. Specifically, the
yields and other advantages of the competing assets into which new saving would otherwise
flow will have to fall enough so that savers prefer bank deposits. (Tobin 1963, p. 413)
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According to Tobin, there are no differences between cases (a) and (b); in both cases, the
banks are able to expand their liabilities only if the wealth owners are willing to modify the
composition of their wealth. In actual fact, there is an important difference between the two
situations. In case (a), when the banks finance the purchase of existing capital goods the fact
of whether or not their liabilities are used as a means of payment is not important. Indeed,
if we assume, as in the previous section, that the moment in which banks create money
coincides with the moment in which wealth owners accept to modify the composition
of their wealth, as happens in the case of the open market operations described in all
macroeconomics textbooks, we must conclude that banks can expand their dimensions
only if the wealth owners accept to modify the composition of their wealth by selling
capital goods and accumulating the liabilities issued by the banks.
Case (b) is very different: the moment in which banks create money to finance investment
decisions does not coincide with the moment in which wealth owners must change the
composition of their wealth in order to store up the new money. In this case, banks’ decisions
to create new money will be influenced by the firms’ credit demand and not by the wealth
owners’ choices; it is only after the creation of money that the conditions necessary to
induce wealth owners to accumulate new money will have to be created. From the logical
point of view, these two instants are separated by the variation in the flows of investment,
income and saving, generated by the decisions of banks, firms and households. In this
case, we can divide the money creation process into two phases: in the first, banks create
money to finance the firms’ investment decisions. In this phase, banks and firms are the
principal actors and their decisions are not conditioned by the decisions of wealth owners.
The investments financed by the banks determine an increase in income according to what
defined by the Keynesian income theory. Once the income creation process described by the
Keynesian theory is completed, the second phase, in which the decisions of wealth holders
become important, is entered into; the new money created by banks is added to the existing
money and the saving flow generated by investment decisions increases the public’s wealth.
The second phase is the one in which the conditions are created for the wealth owners to
accept to hold the money created by the banks.
The fact that the necessary conditions must be created to encourage wealth owners to
absorb the new money created by banks to finance firms’ investment decisions does not
imply that wealth owners by their choices can influence the quantity of money since the
wealth owners come on the scene after money is created. Only in case (a) can we assume,
as Tobin does, that the capacity of the banks to create money depends on the willingness
of wealth owners to alter the composition of their wealth, and we can consider banks as
intermediaries who set themselves the objective of satisfying the portfolio preferences of
debtors and wealth owners.
To describe the process of money creation carried out by the banks to finance firms’
investment decisions, it is also necessary to specify the income account and to distinguish
the two stages of the money creation process: the moment in which banks create money to
finance firms and the moment in which the new money is accumulated by wealth owners.
These points can be analysed by using a simple model that specifies two distinct markets:
the money market (or deposit market) and the credit market. The credit market is made up
of flow variables: the credit demand function reflects the behaviour of firms; this demand
for liquidity can be considered as a demand for credit since it is expressed by actors who
(1) do not have liquidity and (2) who, when they obtain the cash, undertake to pay it
back at a fixed future date. By specifying the credit demand function, we distinguish the
firms’ demand for liquidity to finance investment decisions from the demand for bank
money which instead reflects the portfolio decisions of wealth owners.8 As for the credit
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supply function, following an important tradition based on the works of economists such
as Wicksell, Keynes and Schumpeter, we assume that the supply of credit does not depend
on saving decisions but depends on the decisions taken by banks (for a more detailed
analysis, see Bertocco 2005, 2007, 2010). The money market is made up of stock variables.
The model describes a system composed of five markets: money, which corresponds to
bank deposits; monetary base; bank credit; government bonds and commodities. We can
represent the credit market using the following equations:
rl = (1 + q)r∗, (1)
I = I (πe; rl), (2)
L = I, (3)
D + FINB = L + R, (4)
R = qkD, (5)
FINB = R, (6)
BM = FINB. (7)
Equation (1) introduces the typical assumption of the horizontalist version of the en-
dogenous money theory, according to which banks set the interest rate on loans rl by
applying a markup on the official discount rate exogenously set by the monetary authority
r∗. Firms define the desired investments (I) according to their expectations of profits π e
and the loan rate (Equation (2)). Equation (3) defines the demand for credit from firms; for
simplicity, let us assume that the self-financing of firms is equal to zero and that bank credit
is the only source of financing for firms. Let us further assume that banks meet firms’ de-
mand for credit to finance the desired investments; this equation describes Keynes’s finance
motive as credit demand.9 Equation (4) specifies the balance sheet condition of the banks;
the sum of the deposit flow D and the financing that banks receive from the central bank
FINB, corresponds to the sum of the credit flow L and the flow of required reserves R.
Equations (5)–(7) describe the monetary base market. It is assumed that only banks demand
monetary base to constitute the required reserves; Equation (5) specifies that the amount
of the required reserves depends on the flow of deposits D. Equation (6) determines the
banks’ demand for monetary base from the central bank FINB; this demand corresponds
to the amount of the required reserves R. Finally, Equation (7) determines the monetary
base flow BM created by the monetary authorities to meet the demand from banks; it is
assumed that the central bank sets the official discount rate r∗ and meets the bank’s demand
for monetary base. This first set of seven equations determines rl, I , L, D, R, BM
and FINB.
Given the investment flow I , it is possible to determine the income level. Equation (8)
determines the level of income Y as a function of investment, public spending G and the
propensity to save s:
Y = Y (I ,G,s). (8)
The equations described so far determine the flow of new money created by banks as
a function of the loans granted, but they do not specify under which conditions the wealth
owners are willing to accumulate the money created by the banks.10 These conditions can
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be defined by considering the money market:
D = Dt−1 +D, (9)
D = f (W ;rD;rb), (10)
W = Wt−1 + S(Y ). (11)
Equation (9) determines the stock of money (D); let us recall that in this model, money
corresponds to bank deposits (D). The stock of money corresponds to the stock existing at
the beginning of the period Dt-1 to which is added the flow of deposits created in the current
period. Equation (10) describes the money demand function that depends on the stock of
wealth W , the rate on deposits rD which is assumed given, and the rate on bonds rb. Finally,
Equation (11) determines the value of the stock of wealth as a sum of the stock existing at
the beginning of the period Wt-1 and the saving flow S(Y ) that is registered in the course of
the period. Equations (9)–(11) determine the unknowns rb, D and W .
This model is very rough as it overlooks some important issues: (1) it envisages the
firms’ continuous indebtedness to which corresponds households’ accumulation of wealth
and it does not consider the loan repayment phase and the consequences of the failure to
repay loans, issues that are central to the analysis of Minsky (1975, 1980, 1986); (2) it
overlooks the fact that firms can finance themselves by using existing money, owned by
wealth owners, obtained by issuing shares or bonds, and it does not consider that firms can
substitute their debt with the banks by the issue of shares or bonds; (3) it overlooks the fact
that bank credit can also be used to finance the acquisition of existing capital goods; (4) it
overlooks the presence of non-bank intermediaries.11
However, this model has an important advantage: the specification of the process of
investment financing that is carried out within the credit market makes it possible to justify
the Keynesian thesis that investments determine saving and not vice versa.12 The inversion
of the relation between investment and savings with respect to the tenets of the neoclassical
theory makes it necessary to explain how the firms acquire the purchasing power necessary
to finance the desired investments. The explicit consideration of the presence of bank money
makes it possible to elaborate this explanation. The investments are financed by means of
the creation of bank money and they are realised independently of the saving decisions.
The process of credit money creation through which banks finance investment decisions
was described by specifying the credit market and the monetary base market (Equations
(1)–(7)). Central banks, banks and firms are the main actors in this phase. Investment
decisions generate an increase in income, giving rise to a savings flow that is equivalent
to investments. As well as deciding how much of his income to save, a saver must decide
‘in what form he will hold the command over future consumption which he has reserved’
(Keynes 1936, p. 166). The specification of the money market (Equations (9)–(11)) makes
explicit the conditions under which the wealth holders are willing to accumulate the money
created by the banks. The savings flow determined by investment decisions constitutes,
as shown by Equations (10) and (11), a necessary element in order to determine these
conditions. The explicit consideration of the presence of bank money enables us to affirm
that investments and savings are determined in two separate logical steps: in the first step,
the firms carry out the investments thanks to the money obtained from the banks, and at a
different time, which is later than the first step from a logical point of view, an equivalent
flow of saving caused by the variation of the income is determined. The rate of interest
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therefore cannot be determined by saving and investment decisions because there is no ex
ante saving to contrast with ex ante investment of firms.
4. Bank money and the characteristics of a monetary economy
The thesis put forward in this paper is that, in contrast to what Tobin stated, the presence
of banks and bank money constitutes the necessary element for explaining the structural
changes that distinguish a monetary economy from a real exchange economy. To illustrate
this theory it is necessary to highlight the function of banks that Tobin neglected; that
is, it is necessary to highlight the process of money creation carried out by the banks to
finance firms’ investment decisions. It will be shown that the specification of the presence
of bank money and of the two phases of the money creation process allows us to provide
an explanation of the monetary nature of the fluctuations in the effective demand which is
sounder than that based on the liquidity preference theory and on Tobin’s theory of financial
intermediaries.
To this end, it is useful to recall the key aspects of the liquidity preference theory.
Keynes asserts that the inability of the classical theory to explain the fluctuations in income
derives from the way in which this theory explains the phenomenon of the rate of interest.13
He presents an alternative interest rate theory capable of explaining why in the presence of
an insufficient effective demand to ensure full employment, the rate of interest ‘does not
automatically fall to the appropriate level’ (Keynes 1936, p. 31). In the second chapter of
the General Theory, Keynes states that the presence of money is the essential element on
which the theory of the rate of interest is founded: ‘We shall discover . . . that money plays
an essential part in our theory of the interest rate’ (Keynes 1936, p. 32). In Chapter 13 of
the General Theory, Keynes criticises the classical theory that states that the interest rate
does not depend on saving decisions but on the liquidity preference. The money demand
function or, to use Keynes’s terminology, the liquidity preference schedule, is defined by
considering the store of wealth function of money and by specifying the factors that induce
wealth owners to accumulate money; the interest rate is one of these factors.
Keynes specifies that the relation between liquidity preference and the rate of interest
is based on a necessary condition: the presence of uncertainty about the future rate of
interest.14 Moreover, the presence of uncertainty allows Keynes to highlight a key aspect
of the money demand function: its instability. The consequences of the fluctuations in the
liquidity preference depend on the characteristics of the money supply function; in the
General Theory, Keynes assumes that the quantity of money is controlled by the monetary
authorities and that it can vary independently of the money demand. He therefore concludes
that the fluctuations in liquidity preference do not cause changes in the quantity of money
but that they influence the level of the interest rate. Given the quantity of money, the
rate of interest depends on operators’ expectations about the future interest rate level; this
implies that the rate of interest could be a different level from that coherent with Say’s law.
Tobin set out to create a more general macroeconomic model than the one associated with
the General Theory, which is based on the assumption that all assets other than money
are perfect substitutes, and concludes that the elimination of the assumption of perfect
substitutability and the presence of financial intermediaries does not modify the nature of
the monetary policy transmission mechanism defined in the General Theory, even though
the quantitative effects of a given variation in the quantity of money will, of course, be
different (see Tobin 1969).
Unlike Tobin, I believe that the explicit consideration of the presence of banks and
the process of bank money creation reduces the relevance of the explanation of income
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fluctuations and of the criticism of Say’s law based on the liquidity preference theory. I think
that the liquidity preference theory and Tobin’s approach tend to minimise the capacity of
the monetary authorities to influence the interest rates which depends essentially on the
expectations of wealth owners, as the central bank can influence the interest rates only
indirectly through control of the quantity of money. We can underline that in a world where
bank money is used, the monetary authorities directly set the interest rate at which they
finance the banking system; we can assume that this reinforces their capacity to influence
the interest rate level which conditions the firms’ investment decisions. This affirmation
is coherent with the decisions made in recent years by the monetary authorities of the
industrialised countries. They have abandoned the control of monetary aggregates and
instead target short-term interest rates (see e.g. Bank of England 1999, Mishkin 1999,
Romer 2000, Woodford 2003, Bindseil 2004, Fullwiler 2006, Nishiyama 2007). We can
maintain that the fact that the monetary authorities can set the short-term interest rate at
any level desired, even at a rate close to zero, affects households’ liquidity preference and
the long-term interest rates and makes it more difficult to assume that unemployment can
be attributed to the effects of liquidity preference on long-term interest rates. In other words,
we can assume that the expectations regarding future interest rate values are influenced by
the value of r∗ set by the monetary authorities, (see e.g. Wray 2006, p. 274; Tily 2007,
chap. 7). It is therefore difficult to assume that the presence of unemployment is due
to the liquidity preference that determines a value of the interest rate higher than that
coherent with full employment. We must recognise that the explicit consideration of the
bank money creation mechanism that characterises the theory of money endogeneity reduces
the importance of the liquidity preference theory in explaining the fluctuations in aggregate
demand and therefore in income and employment.
I further hold that there is a second limitation in the liquidity preference theory: this
theory assumes, as recalled above, that there is uncertainty. Uncertainty, in particular about
the future rate of interest, is the exogenous element starting from which Keynes, in the
General Theory, justifies the store of wealth function of money and formulates the liquidity
preference theory. The importance of money is explained by this exogenous element of
uncertainty; it is evident that the thesis of the non-neutrality of money would assume more
importance if we could explain the importance of the dimension of uncertainty starting
with the presence of money. This is what Keynes tries to do in his 1933 works in which
he highlights the need to elaborate a monetary theory of production in order to explain the
phenomena of the crisis and the fluctuations in income and employment, and he notes that
the inability of the classical theory to explain these phenomena is due to the fact that this
theory considers money as a neutral variable.15 Keynes defines the fluctuations in aggregate
demand that give rise to booms and depressions as ‘a monetary phenomenon’ (Keynes
1933b, p. 85) in as much as these fluctuations depend on the particular characteristics
of money used in a monetary economy. He explains this concept by observing that in a
monetary economy or, as it is otherwise defined, in an entrepreneur economy, the presence of
money changes the law of production compared to the one that characterises the economic
system described by the classical theory, and he illustrates this thesis using a framework
described by Marx:
[Marx] pointed out that the nature of production in the actual world is not, as economists seem
often to suppose, a case of C-M-C′, i.e. of exchanging commodity (or effort) for money in order
to obtain another commodity (or effort). That may be the standpoint of the private consumer.
But it is not the attitude of business, which is a case of M-C-M′, i.e. of parting with money for
commodity (or effort) in order to obtain more money. (Keynes 1933a, pp. 81–82)
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The presence of money not only changes the unit of measurement with which the
marginal proceeds are expressed, but above all it changes the nature of the marginal pro-
ceeds. In the economic system described by the classical theory, the marginal proceeds
coincide with the marginal productivity of labour as firms are sure that they will sell ev-
erything they produce. Instead in a monetary economy or, as it is otherwise defined, in an
entrepreneur economy, the marginal productivity of labour as the presence of money makes
fluctuations in the aggregate demand possible; in this case firms are not sure that they will
sell everything they produce:
The explanation of how output which would be produced in a co-operative economy may be
‘unprofitable’ in an entrepreneur economy, is to be found in what we may call, for short, the
fluctuation of effective demand . . . . In a co-operative or in a neutral economy, in which sale
proceeds exceed variable cost by a determinate amount, effective demand cannot fluctuate . . .
But in an entrepreneur economy the fluctuations of effective demand may be the dominating
factor in determining the volume of employment. (Keynes 1933a, p. 80)
In a monetary economy, entrepreneurs take their decisions on the basis of an expectation
of future revenues expressed in monetary terms. The relevant aspect of this conclusion does
not, of course, relate to the unit of measurement as expectations could be expressed in
terms of unit of production, but it relates to the fact that expectations are elaborated by
entrepreneurs in conditions of uncertainty due to the fluctuations in the effective demand
which makes it impossible to predict future profits in probabilistic terms. As Keynes
considers fluctuations in effective demand a monetary phenomenon, we must conclude that
the presence of money constitutes the necessary condition to justify the importance of the
dimension of uncertainty. In other words, we must conclude that Keynes defines the law of
production that characterises a monetary economy by expressing the costs and the marginal
proceeds in monetary terms to highlight the fact that the presence of money, by making
possible fluctuations in aggregate demand, ‘produces’ uncertainty.
We must thus conclude that in his 1933 works, Keynes defined the causal link between
money and uncertainty in the opposite way to that which characterises the liquidity pref-
erence theory, according to which, as we recalled, the presence of uncertainty constitutes
the necessary condition to justify the store of wealth function of money. From the 1933
works, an explanation of the non-neutrality of money emerges, according to which the
presence of money constitutes the necessary condition for the dimension of uncertainty,
which Keynes underlines as an element that distinguishes a monetary economy from the
economy described by the classical theory, to become central.
To define this relation, it is necessary to explain what are the characteristics of money
that permit us to consider the fluctuations of effective demand as a monetary phenomenon.
Keynes stresses that the characteristic of money that allows us to define the fluctuations of
effective demand as a monetary phenomenon is the fact that it is not produced by means of
labour.16 If money was a good which could be produced by labour, as in the case of gold,
fluctuations in the aggregate demand would not lead to persistent unemployment because
the unemployed could, at least theoretically, set about mining gold (Keynes 1933a, p. 85).
In the General Theory, Keynes defines two essential properties of money: (1) zero elasticity
of production and (2) zero elasticity of substitution between liquid assets and reproducible
goods. The first property refers to the fact that entrepreneurs cannot cause more money to
be produced by hiring additional labour. By the second property, Keynes means that ‘as
the exchange value of money rises there is no tendency to substitute [producible goods] for
it’ (Keynes 1936, p. 231). In his works written after the General Theory, as we have seen,
Keynes considers a particular money that is not produced by labour, that is bank money.
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The thesis put forward in this paper is that the explicit consideration of the presence of
bank money and of the endogenous money theory enables us to highlight two fundamental
characteristics of a monetary economy: (1) a monetary economy is characterised by the
presence of uncertainty and (2) fluctuations of effective demand are a monetary phenomenon
and Say’s law does not apply. In the following two sections, these two characteristics of a
monetary economy will be analysed.
4.1. Money and uncertainty
The causal relation between money and uncertainty is based on two points. The first is the
relation between investment decisions and uncertainty; the second is the relation between
money and investment decisions.
The relation between investment decisions and uncertainty can be explained by recalling
that Keynes (1937a) accuses the classical theory of having overlooked the dimension of
uncertainty and claims that this theory is able to describe only a world without uncertainty,
that is an economy in which consumption decisions prevail and decisions on investment
and wealth accumulation, whose results – not predictable in probabilistic terms – are seen
in a more or less distant future, are absent.17 Naturally, it would be excessive to claim that
the classical theory describes an economic system based only on consumption decisions;
instead, what divides the classical theory from the Keynesian theory is the specification of
the characteristics of investment decisions. The classical theory considers investments as a
phenomenon that depends on saving decisions and is independent of the presence of bank
money. This conception can be applied to a corn economy in which corn is at the same
time, according to Smith (1776), a consumer good if it is used to maintain an unproductive
worker, that is a worker involved in the production of services in favour of the upper classes,
or a capital good if instead it is used as wages to pay the productive worker, i.e. a worker
involved in producing corn. Or it can be applied to the fishermen’s economy described by
Bo¨hm-Bawerk (1884) to illustrate his interest rate theory; in both cases they are economies
that produce just one good.
What distinguishes the investments that characterise the monetary economy described
by Keynes is the fact that they are closely associated with the dimension of uncertainty.
Of course even in the case of an economy that produces just one good, we can assume
that an entrepreneur is not able to predict in probabilistic terms the future results of his
decisions. This situation arises due to extra-economic factors such as unfavourable climatic
conditions that ruin the harvest, or social–political events such as the breakout of a war, and
so forth. What distinguishes the investments that are made in a monetary economy is the
fact that the impossibility of predicting their results in probabilistic terms is due to factors
of an economic nature. This conclusion can be understood if we consider the examples of
investment decisions used by Keynes:
Our knowledge of the factors which will govern the yield of an investment some years hence is
usually very slight and often negligible. If we speak frankly, we have to admit that our basis of
knowledge for estimating the yield ten years hence of a railway, a copper mine, a textile factory,
the goodwill of a patent medicine, an Atlantic liner, a building in the City of London, amounts
to little and sometimes to nothing; or even five years hence. (Keynes 1936, pp. 149–150)
The future yield of a railway, a copper mine or an Atlantic liner are not easily foreseeable
because they do not coincide with the productivity of some specific productive factors such
as land in the case of the Smith’s corn economy, or the boat in the case of Bo¨hm-Bawerk’s
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fishermen’s economy. The investments considered by Keynes have the same characteristics
as the innovations that are at the centre of Schumpeter’s analysis. As is well known,
Schumpeter holds that innovations constitute the first endogenous factor that brings about
the process of change characterising a capitalist economy. The phenomenon of innovation
regards the sphere of production and it may consist of the realisation of a new product, the
introduction of a new productive method or the opening of new markets.
Just like the innovations of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, the investments of the
Keynesian entrepreneur do not consist of merely adding to the existing stock of capital
goods new units of capital goods identical to the existing ones, i.e. they do not simply
consist in the production of new fishing boats. Instead, these are the characteristics of the
investments described by Tobin; in fact, he assumes that there is a stock of homogenous
physical capital, for example a certain number of fishing boats, and that these capital goods
last forever and generate a perpetual stream of returns. He therefore assumes that the
investment decisions consist in adding to the existing stock of capital new units of capital
identical to the existing one. He further assumes that the value of existing capital goods can
be different from the price of newly produced capital goods and that investment decisions
increase when the market value of existing capital goods exceeds their cost of reproduction,
that is, when Tobin’s q is greater than one.
Keynes recognises that the variations in the prices of the existing capital goods
represented by the changes in the quotation of shares in the security markets can influence
current investments, but he separates these investments from those that he associates
with the figure of the entrepreneur and the concept of enterprise.18 The investments of
the Keynesian entrepreneur can be considered as the tool through which innovations are
introduced, so the Keynesian entrepreneur who takes the investment decisions coincides
with the Schumpeterian entrepreneur who introduces innovations.19 The presence of
investments and innovations gives prominence to the uncertainty dimension. In an
economy in which just one good is produced, such as a corn economy whose investments
are made up of unconsumed corn, entrepreneurs are sure of using whatever they produce
either as a consumer good or as an investment good because the good produced is what
ensures the survival of consumers. This does not hold when we consider innovations
that give rise to the production of new goods: the entrepreneur who produces the
new good is not at all sure that he will be able to sell, making a satisfactory profit,
all of the production because the innovation alters the existing world, making it very
difficult to predict the reaction of the consumers to the new proposal (Schumpeter 1912,
p. 65).
For this reason, both Keynes and Schumpeter note that investment decisions and inno-
vations are carried out by agents who have particular skills, that is by agents who are able
to take decisions in conditions of uncertainty, guided by what Keynes defined as animal
spirits.20
The second link of the causal sequence between money and uncertainty is constituted by
the relation between bank money and investments. To explain this relation we can observe
that both the Keynesian entrepreneur and the Schumpeterian innovator-entrepreneur must
have the resources available to them to carry out their investments; bank money is the tool
that enables them to obtain these resources. The importance of bank money can be explained
by recalling that the investments that characterise a monetary economy are very different
from those that are found, for example, in Smith’s corn economy. In a corn economy, to
invest means to decide not to consume a part of the corn crop in order to produce more corn,
while in a monetary economy to invest means, for example, to decide to build a railway;
building a railway would be very difficult without bank money.
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Indeed, let us suppose that in our corn economy an entrepreneur emerges who, following
his animal spirits, plans to build a railway the construction of which requires the employment
of a certain number of workers for 10 years. Let us further suppose that the existing
production techniques make it possible to produce a quantity of corn sufficient to guarantee
the survival of the farm workers and those that might be employed in the construction of the
railway. We can observe that the railway, at least theoretically, could also be built in a corn
economy21; in this case, the construction of the railway is financed by the corn producers
who give to our entrepreneur the corn necessary to pay the workers involved in building the
railway. In return, they receive debt claims that will give them, when the railway is built,
the right to obtain a quantity of corn equal to the amount lent during construction plus a
premium consisting of the interest.
There are at least two elements that impede the realisation of this credit contract. The
first is the fact that it is very difficult for corn producers to assess whether the entrepreneur
who plans to construct the railway will be able to return the loaned capital because the credit
contract necessary to finance the construction of the railway is very different from the one
that is usually made in a corn economy, under which the corn producer gives the excess
corn over the amount he intends to consume to another producer who will use it to produce
corn. In this case, given the production technique, it is easy for the creditor to calculate
the yield of the loaned corn and thus to define the rate of interest to apply to the debtor; in
the case of the railway this evaluation is much more difficult because there is no physical
law that makes it possible to calculate how much corn will be obtained by the sale of train
tickets starting from the amount of corn used to build the railway. The second difficulty
concerns the duration of the loan; our entrepreneur will have to find corn producers who
are willing to wait 10 years before obtaining repayment of the loan.
The construction of the railway becomes easier in a world in which bank money is used.
In this case, our entrepreneur will have to convince the banks, not the corn producers, of
the profitability of his project. The banks will finance the construction of the railway by
creating new money with which our entrepreneur will pay the workers who will then be able
to buy corn. The corn producers will not have any difficulty in exchanging corn for bank
money, which is a perfectly liquid debt claim that can be used as a means of payment at any
time. Although they do sell corn to the workers involved in building the railway, the corn
producers are not creditors of our entrepreneur who is instead in debt to the bank, which
is in turn in debt to those who own bank money. These agents may be the corn producers
if we assume that the latter decide to accumulate the money obtained by selling the corn,
or other agents that decided to accumulate the money obtained from payment of goods or
services.
The risks associated with the railway construction do not fall on the corn producers
but on the bank and on all those who accumulated bank money. Banks therefore carry out
a key role in a monetary economy: they evaluate the applications for financing presented
by entrepreneurs. The banks share with the entrepreneurs the responsibility of deciding
which investments are carried out; with their decisions they influence the development of
the economic system; it is a very different role from that of mere intermediary that they
could perform in a corn economy by facilitating the transfer of corn saved to the producers
who intend to expand their grain production. Thus, we can maintain that the presence of
bank money, and a well-developed credit market, constitutes the necessary condition for the
development of an economy in which investment decisions become relevant and in which
the presence of uncertainty becomes an essential factor; we can state that uncertainty is not
merely an exogenous dimension, but it becomes a factor whose presence is explained by
the spread of bank money.
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4.2. Bank money and Say’s law
The second important structural change that can be associated with the presence of bank
money relates to the fact that in a monetary economy Say’s law does not apply. The
typical Keynesian explanation is based on the liquidity preference theory; in the previous
paragraphs we underlined the limits of this explanation. We can formulate a different
explanation for the reasons why in a monetary economy that uses bank money and in which
the endogenous money theory holds, Say’s law does not apply. In order to illustrate this
thesis, we can suppose that there exists a positive value of the interest rate so low to cause
a flow of demand for investment goods coherent with the full employment income.22 In the
world described by the classical theory when the interest rate assumes that value, which,
following Wicksell, we can define the natural rate of interest, there will be a flow of credit
supply, determined by saving decisions, which is equal to the flow of investment coherent
with the full employment income. In this case, Say’s law is satisfied and banks are only
intermediaries, which lend what is lent to them by savers.
The same conclusion is reached if we assume that the monetary authorities are able
to control the interest rate and to set the level in correspondence with the optimal rate of
interest compatible with full employment.23 However, this conclusion is based on a weak
hypothesis which assumes that investment decisions depend only on the rate of interest and
that banks always create the flow of money necessary to finance the investments desired
by firms. Kaldor and other supporters of the endogenous money theory maintain that the
banks meet only the credit demand of firms they deem to be creditworthy. This means that
once they have fixed the rate of interest on money, the banks are not necessarily willing
to satisfy the whole credit demand from firms.24 The banks could, for example, consider
the construction of the railway too risky; in this case the workers who could have built the
railway will not be employed and there will not be sufficient demand for corn to absorb all
the production. Say’s law cannot be applied; the level of income depends on the effective
demand and the Keynesian inversion of the causal relation between savings and credit
works.
This bank behaviour can be explained by the presence of uncertainty which, as we have
seen, characterises a monetary economy in which there is a consistent flow of investments
financed through the creation of bank money. In condition of uncertainty, that is, in a
situation in which, according to Keynes (1937a, p. 114): ‘there is no scientific basis on
which to form any calculable probability whatever’ on the future returns on investment
decisions, we may suppose that banks and entrepreneurs have different expectations about
the future results of the same investment projects; this triggers fluctuations in the flow
of investments and therefore in the aggregate demand that can be defined a monetary
phenomenon in that they are associated with the presence of bank money.
4.3. The question of the financial system regulation
The arguments presented above enable us to draw some observations about the role of the
banking system in the global financial crisis and about the question of the financial system
regulation. We have seen that in a monetary economy the banking system is not a neutral
institution. The presence of banks and the use of bank money are the necessary condition
for the development of an economic system based on the introduction of innovations that
uninterruptedly change the production structure. In a monetary economy uncertainty is not
merely an exogenous dimension, but it becomes a factor whose presence is explained by
the spread of bank money: banks and bank money create uncertainty.
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Awareness of the banks’ social function of selector of innovating entrepreneurs leads
Schumpeter (1939, pp. 90–91) to specify the features of the banker’s behaviour. In the first
place, the banker must know how to assess the characteristics of the investment project to be
carried out and the personality of the entrepreneur. Secondly banks must stay independent
of the firms and political power.25 Schumpeter (1939, p. 91) underlines that if the banks
behave improperly the consequences can be disastrous; the wrong decisions of the banks
are ‘sufficient to turn the history of capitalism evolution into a history of catastrophes’.26
Schumpeter’s remarks about the disastrous effects of the improper behaviour of banks have
also been taken up in some contemporary studies. The most important example is the
analysis carried out by Minsky (1975, 1980, 1982), who had been a student of Schumpeter,
which highlights the crucial role of the banks in explaining the instability of capitalism.
Minsky’s analysis of the financial nature of the instability of capitalism is closely connected
with the observations that in the presence of uncertainty the banks’ evaluation can change
suddenly, causing considerable instability in the economic system. Minsky explains that
the alternation of phases of boom and bust is due to changes in banks’ criteria in appraising
firms’ investment projects. There is an endogenous tendency towards instability, since,
in normal periods, firms’ ability to repay their loans constitutes a confirmation of the
validity of their forecasts, and induces banks to believe that they applied excessively rigid
criteria in evaluating the firms’ requests for credit. The upshot of this is that firms will
be encouraged to consider more risky investment projects, and banks will be led to adopt
less rigid selection criteria. This behaviour transforms a normal situation into a boom
fuelled by speculative investments. The relationship between bank money and innovations
described above can bolster the explanation of the alternating boom and bust phases. The
introduction of innovations is a phenomenon capable of raising profit expectations owing
to the conviction that a new era replete with unprecedented opportunities, arising out of
unfolding events, is afoot.27 The anticipation of a new era founded on innovations can render
any project, even the most unlikely one, worthy of financing, as long as it is connected with
the new innovating revolution.28
The specification of the relationship between bank money and innovations allows us to
highlight another feature that characterises a monetary economy: speculation. The example
of the financing of the building of the railway described previously shows that the imple-
mentation of innovations may require long-term financing and then determines the creation
of long-lasting credit and debt relationships. This means that a monetary economy is
characterised by the presence of two groups of agents, wealth owners and debtors, and of fi-
nancial markets in which assets that represent positions of credit and debit are continuously
exchanged. Under these conditions it becomes important to distinguish between enter-
prise and speculation; Keynes assigns ‘the term speculation for the activity of forecasting
the psychology of the market, the term enterprise for the activity of forecasting the prospec-
tive yield of assets over their whole life’ (1936, p. 158). The aim of speculators is to try to
make a profit thanks to the continuous variation in prices of financial assets. These concepts
allow us to explain the explosion of the phenomenon of securitisation that has transformed
the banks and that Stiglitz describes it this way:
The lure of easy profits from transaction costs distracted many big banks from their core
functions. The banking system in the United States and many other countries did not focus
on lending to small and medium-sized businesses, which are the basis of job creation in any
economy, but instead concentrated on promoting securitization, especially in the mortgage
market. It was this involvement in mortgage securitization that proved lethal. In the Middle
Ages, alchemists attempted to transform base metals into gold. Modern alchemy entailed the
transformation of risky subprime mortgages into AAA-rated products safe enough to be held
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by pension funds. And the rating agencies blessed what the banks had done. Finally, the banks
got directly involved in gambling. (2010, p. 6)
The uncontrolled growth of the phenomenon of securitisation is in contrast with the first
Schumpeter’s precept on the behaviour of the banker who ‘must not only know what the
transaction is which he is asked to finance and how it is likely to turn out, but he must also
know the customer, his business, and even his private habits, and get, by frequently “talking
things over with him”, a clear picture of his situation. . . . if banks finance innovation, all
this becomes immeasurably more important’. (Schumpeter 1939, p. 90) This rule of be-
haviour is justified by the fact that banks by financing the construction of the railway push
the whole society to bear the risks of this operation, so they have the institutional duty to
assess with care the characteristics of the project to be financed. The securitisation process
removed the conditions that induce the banks to behave in this way, so it is necessary to
reform the process of securitisation in order to lead the banks to finance the entrepreneurs
that they consider creditworthy. As noted by Roubini and Mihm:
The most important angle of securitization reform . . . is the quality of the ingredients. In the
end, the problem with securitization is less that the ingredients were sliced and diced beyond
recognition than that much of what went into these securities was never very good in the first
place. Put differently, the problem with originate-and-distribute lies less with the distribution
than with the origination. What matters most is the creditworthiness of the loans issued in the
first place. (Roubini and Mihm 2010, p. 194)
The bad behaviour of banks is not the only factor that explains the housing bubble, so
we mention two measures that have been proposed in order to make harder the recurrence of
financial bubbles. The first provides a change in the strategy of the central banks that should
worry not only about the prices of goods that make up the gross national product (GNP),
but also about the prices of financial assets.29 The second measure is the introduction
of a financial transactions tax to deter financial speculation, following Tobin’s proposal
presented in 1971.30
The objection usually raised against the introduction of measures aimed at regulating
the financial markets is that they hinder the process of financial innovation, and then
they cancel the linked benefits. In this respect, it seems appropriate to recall what was
claimed by Galbraith (1990), according to whom financial transactions are not suitable for
innovation. He said, in fact, that any financial innovation is nothing but the merely repetition
of fundamental innovation which consists in the creation of bank money that makes possible
the process of expansion of debt which is the requirement of any bubble and financial crisis.
5. Conclusions
Tobin’s objective is to construct a more general theoretical model than that associated
with Keynes’s General Theory, a model in which the assumption of perfect substitutability
between assets other than money is eliminated, and in which the presence of financial
intermediaries is explicitly considered.
Tobin defines the role of banks by using a model of the capital account and concludes
that there are no reasons to attribute a special role to banks. He criticises the ‘mystique
of money’ and underlines the store of wealth function of money; this vision leads him to
underline that the quantity of money and banks’ dimensions are determined by the wealth
owners’ decisions and thus concludes that there are no reasons to invest them with any
special role with respect to other intermediaries. According to Tobin, the presence of banks
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and financial intermediaries does not alter the structure of the economic system whose
essential aspects can be described by means of the money–capital goods model. Tobin
concludes that the liquidity preference theory provides a good explanation of the reasons
why a monetary economy is characterised by changes in income and employment and
therefore of the reasons why Say’s law is not valid.
This paper outlines that Tobin describes the analysis of the banks only partially as his
models focus on the capital account of an economic system; if we extend the analysis
and consider also the income account, a function of banks emerges that Tobin overlooks.
We can define this function as the monetary function carried out by banks; this function
does not consist so much in creating a liquid asset which satisfies wealth owners’ portfolio
preferences, but it consists, above all, in creating new money and in making existing money
available for financing firms’ investments.
It was recalled that Keynes explicitly considers this function of banks in the works
in which he responds to the criticism levelled at the General Theory by supporters of the
loanable funds theory such as Ohlin and Robertson; in these works Keynes uses the presence
of bank money to eliminate the relation between saving decisions and the rate of interest
that characterises the classical theory. In Section 4, it is underscored that the specification
of the monetary function carried out by banks allows us to conclude, differently from
Tobin, that the presence of banks and bank money radically changes the structure of the
economic system. It has been emphasised that the specification of the process of bank money
creation through which investments are financed allows us to formulate an explanation of
the characteristics of a monetary economy which is sounder than that based on the liquidity
preference theory. In particular, the explicit consideration of the presence of bank money
enables us to highlight two fundamental characteristics of a monetary economy: (1) a
monetary economy is characterised by the presence of uncertainty and (2) fluctuations of
effective demand are a monetary phenomenon and Say’s law does not apply.
Notes
1. ‘A model of the capital account of the economy specifies a menu of the assets (and debts) that
appear in portfolios and balance sheets, the factors that determine the demands and supplies
of the various assets, and the manner in which assets and interest rates clear these interrelated
markets’. (Tobin 1969, p. 16)
2. Tobin (1963, p. 411) specifies the factors that allow intermediaries to carry out their functions:
‘The reasons that the intermediation of financial institutions can accomplish these transforma-
tions between the nature of the obligation of the borrower and the nature of the assets of the
ultimate lender are these: (1) administrative economy and expertise in negotiating, accounting,
appraising, and collecting; (2) reduction of risk per dollar of lending by the pooling of inde-
pendent risks, with respect both to loan default and to deposit withdrawal; (3) governmental
guarantees of the liabilities of the institutions and other provisions . . . designed to assure the
solvency and liquidity of the institutions’.
3. Tobin (1963, p. 415) concludes that even in the absence of reserve requirement, banks’ dimen-
sions are limited by the same factor that determines the size of other intermediaries: the presence
of wealth owners who wish to hold intermediaries’ liabilities. He maintains that ‘it is more ac-
curate to attribute the special place of banks among intermediaries to the legal restrictions to
which banks alone are subjected than to attribute these restrictions to the special character of
bank liabilities’. (Tobin 1963, p. 416)
4. ‘Intermediation permits borrowers who wish to expand their investments in real assets to be
accommodated at lower rates and easier terms than if they had to borrow directly from lenders’.
(Tobin and Brainard 1963, p. 385)
5. Keynes uses the term real exchange economy to denote an economy in which money is just an
instrument that makes it possible to reduce the costs of the exchange; the use of money does
not change the structure of the economic system with respect to a barter economy. By the term
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monetary economy, Keynes refers to an economy in which the presence of fiat money radically
changes the nature of transactions compared with a real-exchange economy. (Keynes 1933a,
p. 408)
6. ‘Ex ante investment is an important, genuine phenomenon, inasmuch as decisions have to be
taken and credit or “finance” provided well in advance of the actual process of investment . . .
In what follow I use the term “finance” to mean the credit required in the interval between
planning and execution’. (Keynes 1937c, p. 216)
7. ‘Surely nothing is more certain than that the credit or “finance” required by ex ante investment
is not mainly supplied by ex ante saving’. (Keynes 1937c, p. 217)
8. To describe the action of intermediaries, Tobin also specifies two distinct markets: that of their
liabilities, the deposits in the case of the banks, and that of their assets. The difference between
Tobin’s analysis and the model described here is the fact that in this paper the credit demand
is associated with investment decisions and therefore the credit market is associated with the
income account.
9. This way of specifying the ‘finance motive’ differs from Keynes’s definition, which considers
finance as ‘essentially a revolving fund’ necessary to finance ‘the planned activity by the
entrepreneur or the planned expenditure by the public’ (Keynes 1937c, pp. 219 and 221). The
definition used in this paper coincides with that elaborated by Dow (1997, p. 72). It is moreover
assumed that credit serves to finance only investments and not consumption. The demand for
investment goods and consumption goods is financed in different ways: the first is financed by
new money created by the banks while the second is financed by income received by workers.
This point was underlined by Minsky (1980) and Dalziel (1996, 2001).
10. As Arestis and Howells state (1996, p. 541): ‘The (flow) demand for new bank lending, on which
the endogeneity case focuses, originates with one set of agents while the (new) deposits that are
created by this lending have to be held by a different set. The first set, (“deficit units”) is a subset
of the latter (“wealth holders”). For the former, what is involved is an income–expenditure
decision; for the latter it is a portfolio consideration’. See also Wray (1990, 1992), Howells
(1995, 2006), Dow (1997), Palley (1996), Rochon (1999), Bertocco (2001, 2005), Fontana
(2003) and Docherty (2005).
11. Examples of more elaborated models are contained in Godley (1999), Bossone (2001), Dalziel
(2001) and Docherty (2005).
12. The relation between the presence of bank money and the causal nexus between investments
and saving has been underlined in particular by Chick (1986). See also Kaldor (1982, 1985) and
Kaldor and Trevithick (1981).
13. ‘There is, I am convinced, a fatal flaw in that part of the orthodox reasoning which deals
with the theory of what determines the level of effective demand and the volume of aggregate
employment; the flaw being largely due to the failure of the classical doctrine to develop a
satisfactory theory of the rate of interest’. (Keynes 1934, p. 489)
14. ‘There is . . . a necessary condition failing which the existence of a liquidity-preference for
money as a means of holding wealth could not exist. This necessary condition is the existence
of uncertainty as to the future of the rate of interest, i.e. as to the complex of rates of interest
for varying maturities which will rule at future dates’. (Keynes 1936, p. 168)
15. ‘The conditions required for the “neutrality” of money . . . are, I suspect, precisely the same as
those which will insure that crises do not occur’. (Keynes 1933b, pp. 410–411)
16. ‘It is the essence of an entrepreneur economy that the thing (or things) in terms of which the
factors of production are rewarded can be spent on something which is not current output, to
the production of which current output cannot be diverted . . . and the exchange value of which
is not fixed in terms of an article of current output to which production can be diverted without
limit’. (Keynes 1933a, p. 85)
17. ‘The whole object of the accumulation of wealth is to produce results, or potential results,
at a comparatively distant, and sometimes at an indefinitely distant, date. Thus the fact that
our knowledge of the future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders wealth a peculiarly
unsuitable subject for the methods of the classical economic theory. This theory might work
very well in a world in which economic goods were necessarily consumed within a short interval
of their being produced. But it requires, I suggest, considerable amendment if it is to be applied to
a world in which the accumulation of wealth for an indefinitely postponed future is an important
factor; and the greater the proportionate part played by such wealth accumulation the more
essential does such amendment become’. (Keynes 1937a, p. 113)
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18. ‘There is no sense in building up a new enterprise at a cost greater than that at which a similar
existing enterprise can be purchased; whilst there is an inducement to spend on a new project
what may seem an extravagant sum, if can be floated off on the Stock Exchange at an immediate
profit. Thus certain classes of investment are governed by the average expectation of those who
deal on the Stock Exchange as revealed in the prices of shares, rather than by the genuine
expectations of the professional entrepreneur’. (Keynes 1936, p. 151)
19. Several economists have emphasised the desirability of integrating the Keynesian theory of
income determination with Schumpeter’s theory of economic development; see for example
Minsky (1986, 1993), Goodwin (1993), Morishima (1992) and Vercelli (1997); for a more
detailed analysis see Bertocco (2007).
20. ‘A large proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than on
a mathematical expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our
decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over
many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits – of a spontaneous urge
to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative
benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities. Enterprise only pretends to itself to be mainly
actuated by the statements in its own prospectus, however candid and sincere. Only a little more
than an expedition to the South Pole, is it based on an exact calculation of benefits to come.
Thus if the animals spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters, leaving us to
depend on nothing but a mathematical expectation, enterprise will fade and die’. (Keynes 1936,
pp. 161–162)
21. In Bresciani-Turroni (1936) there is a similar example.
22. If we consider the discussion in the previous section regarding animal spirits and uncertainty,
it does not necessarily follow that there must be a value of the rate of interest rate higher than
zero with these characteristics.
23. The concept of optimal rate of interest indicates the rate of interest coherent with full em-
ployment: ‘In equilibrium the production of capital goods is determined by equality between
the marginal efficiency of capital and the normal rate of interest but this need not imply full
employment unless the normal rate of interest happens to coincide with the optimum rate; the
optimum rate being the rate consistent with full employment’. (Rogers 1997, p. 21)
24. See for example Tobin (1980), Lavoie (1992, 2006) and Wolfson (1996). The credit rationing
described in these works has different characteristics from that defined on the basis of the
presence of asymmetric information (see Bertocco 2005, 2009).
25. ‘[Banks] must first be independent of the entrepreneurs whose plans they are to sanction or to
refuse. This means, practically speaking, that banks and their officers must not have any stake
in the gains of enterprise beyond what is implied by the loan contact. . . . But another kind
of independence must be added to the list of requirements: banks must also be independent of
politics. Subservience to government or to public opinion would obviously paralyze the function
of that socialist board. It also paralyzes a banking system. This fact is so serious because the
banker’s function is essentially a critical, checking, admonitory one. Alike in this respect to
economists, bankers are worth their salt only if they make themselves thoroughly unpopular
with governments, politicians, and the public’. (Schumpeter 1939, p. 92)
26. Schumpeter considers the bank/industry collusion as an element that can destroy entrepreneurial
activity and innovations (see e.g. De Vecchi 1995, chap. 8).
27. Perez (2002, 2007) uses the Schumpeterian concepts of innovation and credit to explain the
occurrence of boom phases marked by phenomena of speculation, financial innovation and
‘irrational exuberance’.
28. With the introduction of innovations: ‘Opportunities grow explosively. Innumerable en-
trepreneurs will offer their projects to the also growing number of financiers. If they seem
to follow the new paradigm, all projects, good and bad, honest and crooked, are likely to have
access to the required funds’. (Perez 2007, p. 792)
29. ‘We don’t mean to suggest that policy makers should impose drastic interest hikes to curtail
bubbles. That would be dangerous. But a moderate, preemptive approach is appropriate, and far
preferable to the current policy of doing nothing as bubbles grow, and then pulling out the stops
when they finally pop’. (Roubini and Mihm, pp. 235–236) See also European Central Bank
(2010).
30. See for example Krugman (2009).
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